Can India Achieve Its Nuclear Ambitions?
Even though it was among the pioneers of nuclear technology, India’s plan to harness power from nuclear sources has progressed . It was the first developing country to design a complete fuel cycle – from mining and exploration of uranium to its waste management and disposal. Indian scientists also conceptualized an indigenous three-stage program to recycle spent fuel and utilize the country’s vast thorium reserves.
But funding and resource constraints have repeatedly stalled its progress. Sanctions disrupted the program twice. Once in 1974, after India’s first nuclear test, and then again in 1998 after its second. Each time, India became a pariah in the global nuclear community, and key projects—many reliant on partnerships with Western countries—slowed to a crawl.
But net-zero climate goals and a fast-growing economy have breathed new life into India’s nuclear ambitions in recent years. The Indian government has moved speedily to remove bottlenecks in nuclear development.
In her latest budget speech, the country’s Finance Minister unveiled a slew of measures aimed at expanding nuclear power’s share in its energy mix. The headline goal is to install 100 GWe of nuclear capacity—about 15% of India’s estimated energy needs—by 2047. This would involve building new reactors and, for the first time, allowing private participation in the sector.
Currently, nuclear energy contributes just 3% to India’s total power supply. Only the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) and its research subsidiary Bhavini can build and operate nuclear reactors under existing laws. The proposed changes could finally deliver on the long-delayed promise of nuclear energy in India.
But experts warn that the government’s nuclear timelines are “simply unachievable.” India is still in the early stages of planning and may have underestimated the scale of logistical and technological bottlenecks.
Foreign firms—particularly Western nuclear companies—remain hesitant. Regulatory uncertainty continues to deter participation. Many are holding back until India clarifies its liability laws and regulatory framework.
A New Reactor Playbook
To catalyze nuclear development, the Indian government has allocated ₹20,000 crore ($2.3 billion) in the latest budget for a nuclear mission focused on small modular reactors (SMRs). These compact reactors, while less powerful than traditional ones, are cheaper and easier to deploy. A fleet of SMRs can match the output of a large plant and be tailored for use in hard-to-decarbonize sectors like steel and cement.
Late last year, the government issued Requests for Proposals (RFPs) to make Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs)—220 MWe modular versions of the well-established Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). “We’re taking the PHWR design and reconfiguring it to be modular, scalable, and aligned with post-Fukushima safety norms,” said Amit Sharma, Managing Director at Tata Consulting Engineers. The redesigned reactors will also have smaller exclusion zones, reducing land-use conflicts.
Unlocking Private Sector Participation
Regulatory hurdles are also being cleared to boost availability of nuclear financing and expertise. A new public sector entity, Ashvini (Anushakti Vidyut Nigam Ltd), was created last year as a joint venture between NPCIL and NTPC—India’s largest energy conglomerate. The idea is to pool resources between the two entities and fast-track projects.
Although private participation was technically allowed after the 2006 lifting of sanctions, few foreign players came. This was largely because of India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) of 2010. It is the only law in the world that allows operators to hold suppliers liable for damages in the event of a nuclear accident. The law’s ambiguous language, particularly around the definition and scope of “nuclear damage,” has been a major stumbling block.
Major firms like Westinghouse have spent years negotiating with the Indian government for changes. The latest budget indicates that amendments to CLNDA may finally be on the table, potentially opening the door to long-awaited international participation.
Domestic firms are already sensing opportunity. Engineering giant Larsen & Toubro, long a part of the global nuclear supply chain, is reportedly gearing up to expand its role in domestic projects. Reliance Industries, Adani Power, Tata Power, and Vedanta Ltd., are among other prominent local players who have expressed interest in developing the country’s nuclear industry.
India’s Lofty Goals: Can Ambition Meet Reality?
India’s latest targets are ambitious—but they’re not new. In 2016, the government aimed for 20 GW of nuclear power by 2020 and 63 GW by 2032. As of now, it has just 8.1 GW. The country’s first 700 MWe reactor at Kakrapar took eight years longer than expected and ran nearly $1 billion over budget. As such, experts have cautioned against the country’s aggressive timelines.
China, a global leader in modular reactor technology, took almost 15 years to commission its first commercial SMR. India wants to build five within a decade. “It would be pleasantly surprising if even one SMR is operational by 2033,” one analyst noted.
Separately, the government has announced plans to add ten new large reactors by 2032 to reach 22.4 GWe in total nuclear capacity. But there is no news on the status of these projects; they are reported to be in “various stages of implementation,” casting doubt on the feasibility of this target.
Yes, India managed to double its nuclear capacity from 4.7 GWe in 2014 to 8.1 GWe in 2024. But that was during a relatively stable period. Today’s geopolitical uncertainty—including disruptions in fuel supply chains and international tech transfer—adds new risks to an already complex endeavor. While India toes a neutral tightrope, it could easily get caught in the crossfire between China and the US. The country’s dependence on expertise and fuel from the Russian state nuclear agency for its programme adds to the array of risks faced by the programme.
Even in an ideal scenario where nuclear capacity doubles every decade, India will still fall well short of the 100 GWe goal by 2047.
The Land and Fuel Reality Check
Beyond technical hurdles, land acquisition is also a major barrier to achieving India’s goals. Given the global history of nuclear accidents, new reactor sites often face local opposition. In India, critical projects in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have already experienced delays due to land disputes. The costs associated with delays can also strain project finances, forcing agencies like NPCIL to divert resources from construction to debt servicing.
As it ramps up its nuclear programme, India also needs to make provisions for uranium – the raw material that powers the programme. India has limited quantities of uranium and it is of lower grade. It imports the fuel from several countries – Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia, and the United States. But the scale of its imports is relatively small as compared to other countries.
Analysts are predicting a shortage of the fuel in coming years due to limited supply and excess demand from countries rekindling their mothballed nuclear programmes. The increase in demand will have a knock-on effect on the fuel’s price.
Mature technology remains another unresolved issue. India’s three-stage nuclear program is designed to eventually use thorium, but it depends on the intermediate success of fast breeder reactors (FBRs). These reactors recycle plutonium, a byproduct of conventional reactors, and are essential for linking the current uranium-based system to a future thorium-based one.
However, commercialization of FBRs remains elusive. A 2019 report from the Department of Atomic Energy said FBRs were still “decades away” from economic viability. Until then, India will continue to rely on imported uranium and expensive reprocessing technologies—both of which are vulnerable to global supply chain shocks.
